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ABSTRACT This research note describes two simultaneous 
events: The Martin County coal waste disaster of October 2000 
and our own research efforts in Martin County, Kentucky, in 
studying the effects of the disaster on the impacted community. 
Our research was unique in that we involved a large team of un- 
dergraduate students in our field and data collections efforts. We 
also applied more democratic and participatory methods than has 
been typical in the "techno-disasters" research. We believe that 
our expanded method has allowed us to glean insights and under- 
standing into the effects and political dynamics of the Martin 
County coal waste disaster. In this note, we report some of our 
findings from both our field interviews and survey data. As in 
other case studies, we found high levels of blame and distrust of 
the coal company and of federal and state agencies. Much of this 
deep citizen distrust, as we came to learn, was due to EPA yield- 
ing power of jurisdiction to the responsible party. Many citizens 
simply distrusted the risk assessments and water test data being 
put forward by the coal company. 
The  Big Branch Coal Waste Impoundment owned and operated by 
the Martin County Coal Company, a subsidiary o f  Massey Energy 
(MCCC-Massey) occupied approximately 72 acres in Martin 
County, Kentucky. It rested a t  the top of  the stream head to  two  o f  
the county's primary creeks: Coldwater and Wolf Creek. Most o f  
Martin County's eleven thousand inhabitants live between these two 
creeks and subsequently most o f  the County's inhabitants were 
impacted, in some way, by the disaster events of October 2000. 
*Funded in part by various internal grants from Eastern Kentucky Univer- 
sity and the Center for Appalachian Studies, Eastern Kentucky University 
- and the Flex-E-Grant program of the Appalachian Regional Commission. 
The authors wish to thank the three anonymous reviewers for their helpful 
comments. 
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On Tuesday, October 11 at midnight, a coal company employee for 
MCCC-Massey was working near the west mine portal when he 
noticed that the belt line had stopped. Based on documented events 
in one investigative report, the employee then radioed the dis- 
patcher. According to documented events, other Coal Company 
employees were directed to travel to north-end mine operations. 
There, they observed coal slurry flowing out of a mine portal at a 
mounting velocity (U. S. Department of Labor 2001). By the 
night's end, the Big Branch Impoundment had emptied its 72-acre 
contents of black water, coal slurry, and sludge into underground 
mine works below the impoundment. The Mine Safety Health 
Administration (MSHA) estimated that three hundred million gal- 
lons of the slurry and sludge materials escaped into the County's 
two principal creeks (United States Department of Labor, 2001). 
One Martin County citizen, long involved in the coal mining indus- 
try, commented on what came down Coldwater and Wolf Creek that 
Tuesday: 
The coal company and the EPA like to call it slurry. 
Slurry is a fast moving substance. What came 
down Coldwater.. .was very, very slow moving. 
It's magnetite, very thick, thicker than any mud 
you'll ever see. Magnetite is used in the processing 
of the coal. To wash the coal, they use a Daniel's 
washer that uses iron ore magnetite and water. The 
gravity of the magnetite makes the gravity of the 
coal come to the top of the water. The coal floats 
and flows across the Daniel's washer. The water 
then goes back to a magnetic separator. A magnetic 
separator separates the water from the magnetite 
and it sends the magnetite back to the washer. But 
they only get 70 percent recovery of the magnetite 
on average. That other 30 percent goes to the im- 
poundment.. . .That magnetite settles to the bottom 
of the impoundment. There is so much weight to 
that magnetite that you can take a five-gallon 
bucket of it and you cannot carry it. It's that thick. 
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In the days ahead, coal sludge from the devastated creeks 
slowly traveled towards the Tug Fork of the Big Sandy River and 
then snaked its way up through to the Ohio River. In the days ahead, 
town water systems along the affected rivers were forced to close 
their water intakes while the massive sludge plume moved past. 
Based on state official estimates, nearly 28,000 people were without 
public water while emergency water lines were established by 
contingency teams of state, federal and coal company personnel 
(Mueller 2000b). 
Meanwhile, persons in Martin County were describing the 
coal waste disaster as one that paralleled the Exxon-Valdez oil spill. 
The town Mayor, of the City of Inez, in Martin County, made such a 
comparison in an open letter to the Governor of the State of Ken- 
tucky. In calling for disaster relief, the Mayor wrote: 
After touring the site of destruction on Coldwater 
Creek, which also runs through the middle of Inez, I 
was amazed to see the effect that this catastrophe 
has created on the lives of many people as well as 
on all wildlife that reside in the area. I feel that the 
only thing that it could be compared to is the Exxon 
VaIdez oil spill in Alaska in the 1980s. 
Not only am I concerned about our water supply, 
residents and wildlife, I am also concerned with the 
environmental impact and economic damage that 
this disaster will cause to Inez and Martin County. 
This could possibly set Martin County back for 
many years to come. The economy in Martin 
County is already bleak but this could be the straw 
that broke the camel's back. 
Also, the potentials for present and future health 
concerns are raised due to the chemicals and such 
that are contained in this spill. (Penix 2000:7) 
During the weeks, months and year to follow, no federal 
. 
disaster funds or federal emergency relief monies were forthcoming 
and many Martin County citizens asked why (Grayson 2000). In 
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later field interviews, citizens continued to comment on the lack of 
federal response to the disaster. One citizen commented: 
This has been the nation's largest spill.. . . Why this 
thing hasn't received national press is kind of a 
shocker. I know there were no lives that were lost, 
but this was a big, a huge environmental disaster. I 
think it is a shame that if this had happened in some 
nicer place, even Pikeville, Kentucky, it may have 
generated some publicity. But it happened in Martin 
County, maybe ten, eleven thousand people living 
here. The coal communities, you know, we're kind 
of forgotten anyway. So, that's something that 
bothers me. 
Another citizen said: 
The coal company [MCCC-Massey] had it in the 
newspaper - saying this was 'an act of God' and 
that they were doing everything that they could to 
clean up the mess. But everybody knows it's not an 
act of God, it's a disaster. 
A Technological Disaster 
MCCC-Massey and federal and state regulatory agencies defined 
events in Martin County differently. Less than a week after the 
disaster, before full chemical testing on the sludge was even com- 
plete, state and federal officials were allaying public concerns. 
Agency press statements reported detectable levels of heavy metals 
and other compounds in the sludge but "not in harmful amounts." A 
spokesperson for the State of Division of Water was reported as 
saying, "we're saying right now the water is safe. If we determine 
there is a long-term problem we will let people know" (Alford 
2000: 1). The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), on 
October 18, released a press statement that they found "no acute 
toxicity levels in aquatic organisms used in tests" (Alford 2000: 1). 
A consultant for MCCC-Massey was reported as stating, "there 
were some metals in the sludge, but the amounts were below drink- 
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ing water standards" (Mueller 2000a). By the next week, a Coast 
Guard official and member of the National Contingency team, or 
Unified Command Structure, that was set up to respond to the 
disaster, stated that "the metals pose no hazard to public water 
supplies with full treatment" (Associated Press 2000: 1). 
Competing definitions of risk, with the risk assessments of 
experts being privileged, tends to contribute to heightened levels of 
anxiety and stress among residents living in potentially contami- 
nated communities (Edelstein 1988; Picou and Gill 1999). In his 
classic work, Barton (1970:49) describes individuals and communi- 
ties struck by natural disaster as following a clear course of events: 
The predisaster period, the period of detection and warning, the 
period of immediate and relatively unorganized response, the period 
of organized social response, post-disaster equilibrium and the 
subsequent move back to the status quo. Freudenburg (1997) de- 
scribes differences in the stages of technological disaster. He points 
out that residents and communities, confronting an impending, 
sometimes slow, long-term threat of toxic contamination, are typi- 
cally left in a suspended state of uncertainty. Kroll-Smith 
(1995:387) likened this suspended state to living in a "what if' 
environment, in other words, what if the environment is not safe? 
What if the cause of my neighbor's cancer is due to the drinking 
water? In a letter to the editor, a mother in Martin County, ex- 
pressed such fears of "ontological uncertainty" (Gill and Picou 
1998:796). She wrote: 
We are faced with a situation that warrants major 
and immediate attention and begs a multitude of 
questions. Number one, we are being told that our 
water contains a list of chemicals that it would take 
a team of scientists to hold a class about for under- 
standing to seem possible, so is our water safe to 
drink? We are also being told that the chemicals 
contained in our water are at acceptable levels for 
'non hazardous' ingestion. What is an acceptable 
level of arsenic, barium, beryllium, etc.? After years 
of consuming these "acceptable" levels of chemi- 
cals, [the next question] will there be any long last- 
ing, extremely painful, physically noticeable or 
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perhaps fatal effects? If the answer to this question 
is no, then comes [the next question] How do they 
know? Have they exposed other people to this exact 
mixture of chemicals for extended periods of time 
and had no ill effects? . . . I don't know about you, 
but it scares the hell out of me. It is not my life I 
am concerned about. I have a thirteen-year-old son 
who has his whole life ahead of him. At least, he's 
supposed to, barring some 'Act of God.' ... He is a 
wonderful boy who makes straight A's and has a 
very kind heart. I have done the best I could. He is 
doing his best as well. I would find it unforgivable 
to learn that all of his efforts are in vain because 
someone decided to cut comers and some money by 
not disposing of dangerous contaminants prop- 
erly.. . . (Hall-Smith 2001 :4) 
"Knowledge gaps" over the safety of the local biosphere 
tend to breed not only fear and uncertainty, but also heightened 
levels of suspicion in company, state and federal agencies that were 
supposedly mandated to protect the public and keep people safe. 
Freudenburg (1993, 1997) has described this loss of legitimacy in 
regulatory institutions after a technological breakdown as 'recre- 
ancy' - what he describes as "the failure of an expert, or for that 
matter a specialized organization, to do the job that is required 
(1997:33)." Richards and Womersley (1998), from their field and 
survey data, describe patterns of recreancy and the 'attribution of 
P blame' after the metam sodium spill in Dunsmuir, California. In 
Martin County, one resident blamed what he believed to be the 
complete and utter failure of company and government officials in 
preventing the coal waste spill - a disaster that, accurding to him, 
I could have been prevented. He said: 
Their engineers knew just where the mines were at, 
I if they didn't, then they need new engineers, but I 
know that they knew, and they should have taken 
better precautions. Everyone that is involved in 
this, I'm talking your state inspectors, your federal 
inspectors and the people over this mine, that had 
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anything to do with this, should be fired. It is a 
shame that this has happened. 
In the aftermath of technological disaster, Kroll-Smith 
(1995) identified fear, uncertainty, distrust and suspicion as leading 
to retreat and inward withdrawal among some residents. This psy- 
chic retreat, according to Kroll-Smith, contributes to the further 
decline of community and a community's civic capacity. Others 
have also written on social corrosion after a technological or man- 
made disaster (Gill and Picou 1998; Gramling and Krogman 1997; 
Edelstein 1988; Shkilnik 1985). Erikson (1976) wrote of the 1972 
coal waste flood in Logan County, West Virginia and wrote of the 
flood's annihilation of communities on Buffalo Creek and the social 
psychological stressors that ensued among survivors due to the loss 
of community. The 1972 Buffalo Creek coal waste flood released 
over 120 million gallons of slurry and killed 125 persons. The 
Martin County coal waste spill, in comparison, released over 300 
million gallons of slurry and sludge materials but luckily, with no 
loss to human life (Ball 2000). Considering the parallels and con- 
trasts between Buffalo Creek and the Martin County coal waste spill 
and considering other parallels with other cases, it seemed important 
to us, to assemble a research team and go to Martin County. 
The Martin County Project 
Soon after the coal waste disaster in Martin County, Kentucky, a 
team of sociology students and faculty at Eastern Kentucky Univer- 
sity started to talk about the disaster and the prospects of starting a 
research project. Yet, if we initiated such a project, we would have 
to rely on undergraduate students for field assistance and research 
support since we had no graduate program. We asked ourselves 
was this possible? Was it possible to involve a large team of under- 
graduates in a sensitive and potentially litigious research project? 
Was this a good plan? 
We decided to call Duane Gill at the Social Science Re- 
search Center, Mississippi State University and ask his opinion. 
When we called Gill, he listened intently of events in Martin 
-~ 
County. By the end of our telephone conversation, he had agreed to 
visit our campus. In less than a week's time, Gill was at Eastern 
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Kentucky University, talking with students and faculty, in both 
lecture and in seminar, on researching communities hit by techno- 
logical disasters. Beyond theory and case description, Gill also 
spoke on method and research design. He advised our team to 
replicate and fine-tune methods that he and Picou had used in the 
past: personal interviews, survey research techniques, random- 
sampling strategies, and the use of control communities (Gill and 
Picou 1998: 802). On the last day of his visit, Gill traveled with 
our team to Martin County. During the three-hour drive, up the 
Mountain Parkway, Gill provided his most important advice to the 
project team: He enthusiastically advised our team to go ahead with 
our original plan of involving a large team of undergraduate stu- 
dents in our research and field efforts. Gill, after spending several 
days with sociology students in lecture, seminar and on the road, 
concluded that such a research project on such a relatively isolated 
community, "could only be done well with the help of university 
students" - many of whom, as he observed, were, themselves, 
from the region. 
In the weeks to follow, with added confidence, our research 
team made more visits to Martin County. We scheduled meetings 
with state emergency management personnel and coal company 
officials. We also attended public meetings. At these public meet- 
ings, we started to establish more and more field contacts with area 
citizens. Some of these initial citizen contacts proved crucial in 
getting our research project fully off the ground in Martin County. 
Some of our field contacts were, themselves, alumni from Eastern 
Kentucky University and they devoted much of their outside time in 
helping our research team get started. In informal conversation and 
in formal lectures to students, they explained the history of the 
county and its history with the coal mining industry. They explained 
the nuances of federal, state and local politics as we:, as the "poli- 
tics" of regulating the coal industry. Later, when it was time to start 
to conduct field interviews with impacted residents, our key con- 
tacts helped us compile lists of people in the county that we 'should 
probably talk to '. In short, the method that was emerging in Martin 
County was expanding beyond traditional field and survey practices 
and was becoming, increasingly, more democratic and participatory. 
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Table 1. Field Interview Schedule 
Can you share with me where you were when you realized 
that there was a sludge emergency? 
As best you can recollect, how have things unfolded from 
then until now? 
How are things, about getting back to normal? 
There's been talk about the public water supplies, what are 
your thoughts on that subject? 
Do you see folks' attitudes changing about things? 
Has this event caused some hard feelings among folks in the 
community? 
Is there anything that we missed that you think people should 
know? 
Field Interviews 
By January 2001, less than three months after the big break, and 
now with internal grant support provided through Eastern Kentucky 
University, our research team began to gear-up for the field inter- 
view phase of our project. In preparation, we called Shaunna Scott 
at the Sociology Program1 Center for Appalachian Studies, Univer- 
sity of Kentucky. Scott had done extensive field and case study 
work on Appalachian coal mining communities (Scott 1995, 1996a, 
1996b). When we called Scott, she listened and agreed to meet with 
our research team over a weekend workshop. Our citizen contacts 
from Martin County also joined our team that weekend. By the end 
of the workshop, citizens and Scott had helped our project team in 
drafting our set of field interview questions. The question schedule 
that we used in Martin County is presented in Table 1. 
By mid February, our human subjects protocol and field in- 
terview schedule had been approved by our Institutional Review 
Board. We then made plans to conduct our field sweep. During the 
last two weekends of February, twenty university students, trained 
now in field interview methods, conducted tape-recorded interviews 
with area residents. Interviews typically lasted thirty to forty min- 
utes. Each student usually conducted two interviews. Upon leaving 
the field, students were expected to transcribe their taped sessions 
9
McSpirit et al.: The Martin County Project: Researching the Effects of a Technological Disaster
Published by eGrove, 2002
The Martin County Project - McSpirit el al. 171 
with residents. In the end, this resulted in a qualitative database of 
approximately 35 transcripts. 
During these home interviews, students recorded resident's 
recollections of the first days of the disaster, as well as their com- 
ments on the spill's impact on the local environment and watershed. 
Citizens also commented on the cleanup efforts and how the Coal 
Company and state and federal agencies were handling the disaster. 
With respect to the first stages of disaster response, several citizens 
expressed anger that, at the time of the impoundment break, there 
was no warning or contingency plan in place to warn residents 
living downstream of the impending disaster. Some citizens com- 
mented: 
No one notified anyone downstream that this was 
coming and, at that time, it wasn't even down here, 
it was just in the process of coming. And at their 
[the Coal Company] security checkpoint, up there at 
the county road crossing, it was about 10 ft. deep 
there at the time. But you know, it was just like a 
big, gooey glob. It was a whole lot like watching 
lava. You know, the flow of it. And it just kept ac- 
cumulating deeper and deeper. But this has been 
one of my biggest concerns since the spill hap- 
pened, that no one notified anyone downstream that 
it was coming. No warning! Absolutely no warn- 
ing! At any time! And during one of the commu- 
nity meetings I asked [the coal company president] 
as to why and who made that decision and he said, 
that he made that decision. I don't want [the coal 
company president] making that decision with my 
life and my family's life.. .but that was their answer 
to it, they just made that decision. 
I feel that the minute the Coal Company knew that 
it happened, they should have come down Wolf 
Creek and where I live here, on Coldwater, warning 
the people. 
10
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Shattered confidence in state and federal regulatory agencies was a 
constant theme in our field interviews with Martin County residents. 
Many residents expressed complaints with how state and federal 
agencies, especially EPA Region 4, conducted its mitigation and 
assessment strategies. It seemed to many of those that we inter- 
viewed, that Region 4 was deferring to MCCC-Massey and allow- 
ing the coal company to take the lead in environmental cleanup and 
environmental assessment. Several citizens that we interviewed 
were outraged over this. Some said: 
Well, generally things have unfolded sort of 
densely, as far as the public was concerned, the 
company and its officials tried to keep everything 
under the lid, under the cover, not letting any in- 
formation out. So speculation was running wild 
among the public and I thought that was no way to 
handle it. Distrust began to set in about the Coal 
Company, the officials, and whoever the hierarchy 
is that we look up to. We automatically grew a gray 
cloud of distrust of what they were telling us, of 
what they were saying. That's my opinion and I 
would say the opinion of several other people that 
you may or may not have interviewed.. . . But we 
both know that folks will know better than that. It's 
just very, very confusing. The Coal Company isn't 
telling us the facts and they know it. I guess one of 
the main things that people were more troubled 
about more than anything else was that they thought 
that, because of taxpayers' money, that MSHA [The 
Mine, Safety and Health Administration], the EPA, 
that those agencies were in here to protect the citi- 
zens. But really the EPA set up their command sta- 
tion up behind Coal Company guards, who guarded 
the EPA to keep the people away from them. It is 
my understanding that the EPA either did not or 
could not release a press statement or any informa- 
tion without the permission of Martin County Coal. 
Now, that's that's very disturbing. That they would 
try to hide behind Martin County Coal and that they 
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would let the Coal Company approve any release 
that they would want to make. It's very disturbing. 
The only people satisfied with the cleanup are the 
EPA! ' 
In my opinion, the Coal Company is not the prob- 
lem. The Coal Company has done what it has been 
told to do. The problem is EPA and MSHA. The 
people who are supposed to be working for us and 
protecting us are acting like they work for the Coal 
Company. Protecting the Coal Company. If the 
Coal Company were forced to do it, they would do 
it. They are not being forced to do it because well, I 
don't know.. . 
The EPA is the controlling agency. They can over- 
ride MSHA and the Army Corp of Engineers or any 
state, federal agency. The EPA should have been 
the driving force. It's their responsibility to uphold 
the law. They were in denial and are continually 
telling us that nothing harmful is in the water or the 
soil that wasn't there before. They think that be- 
cause we are mountain people that we are ignorant. 
They are the ignorant ones -to think that we are go- 
ing to believe that. 
Surveys 
Based on what we heard being said, our research team started to 
build a survey that reflected what people were saying. We wanted 
our survey to be relevant to the people who received it. We in- 
cluded survey questions on water quality and water treatment and 
other standard inventory questions that measured levels of govern- 
1 Student field notes (February 16, 2001). Student notes on the interview 
report that the resident "expressed anger at the fact that they were not 
questioned by the state or EPA." 
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ment trust, perceptions of risk, and views on regulatory policy, 
environmental recovery and community quality of life. In building 
our instrument, we modified social impact surveys previously 
developed by Picou and Gill (1991, 1992 and 2001) and drew from 
other social impact and risk assessment surveys. For the reader, 
the subset of survey questions that we used to measure resident 
views on the coal mining industry and mine regulations are pre- 
sented in Table 2. 
Our student-faculty research team held several weekend 
seminar sessions to discuss and devise a sampling and distribution 
method for our survey. In the end, we devised a residential sam- 
pling strategy and "drop-ofJ/pick-up" method similar to the sam- 
pling method described by Steele et al. (2001). They describe a 
"drop-ofJ/pick-up" method that has been used in communities in 
Pennsylvania and in other Western states. Up until our survey, there 
has been no comparable hand delivery method used in surveying 
communities in Appalachia. 
In March 2001, less than a month after conducting field in- 
terviews with area residents, our research team surveyed the im- 
pacted area of Martin County during a weeklong survey sweep 
(Spring Break Week). During the survey sweep, students and 
faculty had more opportunity to talk on porch steps with a wider 
range of area residents; they heard their points of view and their 
perspective and comment on things, but this time, students had to 
politely excuse themselves and move on to the next nth house. By 
the week's end, our research team had collected 290 surveys (re- 
sponse rate = 62 percent). 
With survey work in Martin County complete, our research 
team then made plans to survey a control community in accord with 
the suggested research plan. We selected Peny County, Kentucky 
as our control site because of several broad similarities with Martin 
The project team would like to thank to Duane Gill for sharing the social 
impact surveys that he and Steve Picou distributed in 1991, 1992 and 2001 
in impacted and control communities in Alaska after the Exxon-Valdez oil 
spill. We also modified questions from other risk perception surveys. 
Questions were taken from Freudenburg (1993) and Freudenburg and 
Jones (1991) in building our own social impact survey. 
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Table 2. Sample Survey Questions on Coal Mining and Mine 
Regulations. " 
The federal government should set stricter mining standards. 
A local committee should have the power to shut down the im- 
poundment if they decide it is unsafe. 
The mining industry should provide the community with an 
emergency safety plan. 
An impartial inspector should be at the mining site at all times. 
The mining industry should contribute more financially for im- 
proving community facilities (schools, parks, sewage systems). 
The coal company should protect property values in communi- 
ties downstream of the coal waste site. 
I The coal company should dredge the creeks of sludge and silt. I 
The mining industry should establish a local outreach ofice, in 
town, to keep residents informed of mining activities. 
The mining industry is already well regulated by federal and 
state agencies. 
The mining industry should explore other (cleaner) technologies 
to wash coal. 
The mining industry should invest in technologies to cleanup 
sludge spills. 
I I 
a. Residents views were measured on the following scale: 
Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neutral, Agree, Strongly Agree and Don't know 
County: Both Martin and Perry County, for example, are defined by 
the Appalachian Regional Commission as "Distressed Counties" 
and "Core Coal Producing Counties" (Kentucky Appalachian 
Commission 2000). Using a similar 'drop-off / pickup' residential 
sampling design as before, our research team was able to collect 250 
surveys from the Perry County area by the start of the next academic 
year, -September 2001 (response rate =50 percent). 
14
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Table 3. Martin and Perry County Demographic 
Comparisons. 
Martin County Perry County 




Average years spent living 37 yrs. 38 yrs. 
in County 
Homeownership 85% 69% 
Water Source 
Public Water 85% 89% 
Private Well 14% 8% 
Income 
Less than $1 0,000 20% 19% 
Less than $20,000 47% cumulative 38% cumulative 
$21,000 to 40,000 27% 33% 
$41,000 to 60,000 17% 16% 
Over $60,000 9% 13% 
Voted in last local Election? (2000) 
Yes 75% 75% 
Survey Findings 
A comparison of household demographic data between Martin and 
Perry County indicated some striking parallels between samples on 
dimensions of gender, length of residence, public water use, voter 
turnout and income. These similarities in household demographics 
are reported in Table 3. 
Though there were broad parallels between households at 
both sites, it appeared based on our analyses of other survey ques- 
tions, that citizens in Martin and Perry County were thinking differ- 
ently on various issues related to their communities, their economies 
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and their environment. We assumed that some of these attitudinal 
differences between like households, from like communities, were 
due to the impact of the coal waste spill on life in Martin County. 
For example, on several community / quality-of-life dimensions, 
Martin and Perry County citizens were asked to rate the quality-of- 
life in their community on the following scale: Very good, good, 
fair, poor, and very poor. Sixty-two percent of Martin County 
citizens rated the quality of the natural environment in their com- 
munity as "poor- to- very poor" compared to only 23 percent in 
Perry County. On outdoor recreational opportunities, 79 percent of 
Martin County citizens rated outdoor recreational opportunities 
(6 poor- to-very poor" in comparison to only 35 percent in Perry 
County. On job opportunities, 90 percent of Martin County, in 
comparison to 57 percent Perry County residents, rated job opportu- 
nities in their community "poor- to-very poor." These survey 
results are summarized in Table 4. 
On another set of community livability questions, Martin 
and Perry County citizens were asked to rate community concerns 
on the following scale: not a problem, a slight problem, a moderate 
problem, a serious problem. Whereas crime and drugs was the 
highest rated problem among Perry County citizens, Martin County 
citizens reported drinking water as their number one concern. 
Eighty percent - or 8 out of 10- Martin County citizens compared 
to only 24 percent - or 2 out of 10 - Perry County citizens rated 
drinking water 'a serious problem.' Coal waste was also rated high 
as 'a serious problem' in Martin County. An approximate 7 out of 
10 of Martin County citizens (69 percent) rated coal waste a serious 
issue facing their community versus only 12 percent of Perry 
County citizens rating coal waste the same way. These survey 
findings are also reported in Table 4. 
Based on survey comparisons, it appears that on standard 
community, quality-of-life and livability scales, Martin County 
citizens tended to think differently about their environment, the 
economy, their community, the local watershed and the public water 
system than other citizens from the region. Strong differences were 
also noted on reported levels of trust in the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency and in state regulatory agencies. Survey findings 
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Table 4. Community and Quality of Life Profile 
Martin and Perry County Compared. 
Martin County Perry County 
Quality of Community Life 
(Poor to Very Poor) 
Natural Environment 62% 23 % 
Outdoor Recreation 79% 3 5% 
Community Problems 
(A Serious Problem) 
Crime/ Drugs 51% 74% 
Local Environment 41% 16% 
Coal Waste 69% 12% 
1 Drinking Water 80% 
I have trust in ... 
(Strongly Disagree) 
The Environmental Protec- 35% 12% 
tion Agency 
State agencies ... 3 1% 11% 
show Martin County citizens outweighing Perry County citizens at a 
3: 1 ratio on reported levels of strong agency distrust: Martin County 
citizens were more likely to 'strongly disagree7 (35 percent) that 
they 'have trust in the Environmental Protection Agency' in com- 
parison to Perry County citizens (12 percent). Likewise, Martin 
County citizens (3 1 percent) were more likely to 'strongly disagree7 
that they 'have trust in state agencies' in comparison to citizens in 
Perry County (1 1 percent). These survey results are also reported in 
Table 4. 
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Formation of a Citizen Advisory Committee 
In September of 2001, our research team received funding through 
the Flex-E-Grant initiative of the Appalachian Regional Commis- 
sion. This funding allowed us to complete our survey data collec- 
tion efforts in our control community. It also allowed our research 
team to assemble a citizen advisory committee (CAC). The Flex-E- 
Grant program is a civic-capacity building initiative designed to 
offer support for community projects in economically distressed 
communities of Appalachia (Kentucky Appalachian Commission 
2001). We argued that an advisory committee of citizens was 
essential in building civic capacity and assisting in recovery since 
the environmental disaster. Aronoff and Gunter (1992) documented 
a case of local citizen efforts at recovery after an incident (state- 
wide) of polybrominated biphenyl (PBB) contamination in Michi- 
gan. Through grant-writing efforts, and dialogue sessions, citizens 
developed an eight-year strategic and civic action plan to move their 
community towards economic and environmental recovery. This 
case investigation, rather than the wealth of literature on corrosive 
communities, provided us with a policy-oriented model. We cited 
heavily from this case in our bid to secure civic-capacity building 
dollars from the Appalachian Regional Commission. 
With funding, our research team began working closely 
with our CAC in identifying the issues facing Martin County and in 
building a set of recommendations to assist the community in its 
recovery after the disaster. In seminar sessions with students, in 
dialogue sessions with other outside persons, on the telephone, 
through email and through informal conversation, we, with our 
CAC, began to review and catalogue, together, site-specific events 
and site-related documents. With CAC guidance, our research team 
initiated a content-review of regulatory documents and other regula- 
tory agency records on file at the state Division of Water and avail- 
able through the Administrative Record from EPA Region 4 (U.S. 
EPA 200 la). Our content-review of agency reports and water test 
data, as well as our separate content-review of local newspaper 
accounts, tended to corroborate many of the citizen concerns we 
heard first being expressed in our February 2001 fields interviews 
and then conveyed through our survey percentages: Our content- 
review of regulatory documents tended to confirm citizen suspicions 
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over the on-site response structure that was established to guide 
clean-up operations and conduct environmental impact assessments 
after the coal waste spill. It appeared, for example, based on our 
review of enforcement documents, that EPA Region 4, by March 
2001, had indeed awarded power of local jurisdiction to the respon- 
sible party -MCCC-Massey- in site cleanup, site monitoring and 
in developing site mitigation strategies (U.S. EPA 2001b). As one 
citizen had stated, "it is like a fox guarding the chicken coop." 
Citizens, in their field interviews, and now, as part of our CAC, had 
expressed grave concerns with such a response structure, and the 
subsequent water quality and environmental monitoring data that 
was being collected and compiled through the coal company. In 
short, in Martin County, based on our research and documentation, 
it appeared that citizen distrust was more than a lack of confidence 
in the scientific and technocratic discourse of regulatory experts, 
and was more due to the response structure that was set up to moni- 
tor and mitigate the coal waste spill's impact. Many citizens simply 
distrusted the environmental impact statements and mitigation plans 
that were being conducted and filed by MCCC-Massey. 
This response structure, along with a number of other 
documented events, many of which were conveyed to us by our 
CAC, seemed out-of-sync with several environmental statutes and 
Superfund guidelines that were designed to promote citizen in- 
volvement in environmental recovery decisions at contaminated 
sites (Szasz 1994: 133). It appeared, based on testimony from our 
CAC and our own content-review of site relevant documents, that 
citizens were being routinely excluded from environmental recovery 
decisions in Martin County. Instances of citizen involvement, 
effectively being by-passed by EPA Region 4, were documented in 
our final report on civic capacity to the Appalachian Regional 
Commission (McSpirit, Hardesty and Welch 2002). We put forth in 
our report that active citizen participation in community and envi- 
ronmental recovery, would have to be a central component to any 
civic capacity building initiative in Martin County. In our final 
report, we recommended that the channels for citizen input in envi- 
ronmental recovery be expanded. We recommended: 1) citizen 
participation in stream reclamation and stream recovery strategies 
and more importantly, 2) citizen involvement in water quality 
testing and monitoring. These recommendations were developed in 
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close consultation with our CAC. But we also believed that these 
recommendations were reflective of broader local opinion, given 
what we had heard in our field interviews and had seen reflected in 
our survey percentages. 
If, in the end, EPA Region 4 follows through with either 
one of the above two recommendations -and there have been some 
agency maneuvers to that effect- then the implications of our study 
design and research model may be of importance to other research- 
ers who have to assemble a rapid appraisal team to monitor and 
assess the social impacts of a technological disaster on another 
community. 
But there are certain limitations to this type of research and 
policy model. Aronoff and Gunter (1 992:36 1) speak to these limita- 
tions, stating that active citizen involvement in environmental 
recovery might only imply that citizens are not "disempowered" by 
the effects of a disaster and such involvement does not necessarily 
imply "empowerment." Considering that technological disasters 
tend to happen out-of-sight, at less-regulated, often high-risk facili- 
ties, in poor communities, here, and elsewhere, there are larger 
structural policy changes that need to be made before such commu- 
nities, and the people living in them, are empowered enough to have 
some say in the quality and livability of their local environments 
and their communities. 
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